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1 Introduction
It is now well recognized that the research and development (R&D) activity which allows to discover
new technologies or to improve them is essential in the development of an economy. A fundamental
question which may be set concerns the different possible schemes to fund research. From the seminal
papers of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a), Aghion and Howitt (1992), the way to
answer this problem is usually the same in endogenous growth literature. Once an idea is produced
by a scientist, it is associated to a particular intermediate good. Then, any intermediate producer
benefits from a patent, purchased from the R&D sector, to produce and to sell his good. The rents
earned from the sales of intermediate goods produced around innovations allow to reward scientists
and therefore to keep incentives to conduct research.
In this paper, we look at the question of the funding of research in R&D-based models without
any intermediate goods production sector. Basically, the main characteristics of such models are the
following. The final output is produced along with Yt = F (At, private inputs) and the R&D technology
is given by
•
At = G (At, private inputs) , where At is knowledge and there is not any intermediate goods
embodying ideas inside private inputs. This approach simplifies greatly the analysis, in particular the
welfare one. But at the same time, it raises the problem of the way to give incentives to invest
in research. Indeed, it is now impossible to consider the standard equilibrium used in the whole
endogenous growth literature.
Jones (2001, 2002, 2003) exposes several examples of models that do not incorporate any interme-
diate goods production sector. Jones (2001) proposes one particular type of decentralized equilibrium
in such a framework. However, he does not define any market and any price for innovations. The
consequence of this drawback is that we do not know neither the instantaneous price nor the current
expected value of an innovation in the decentralized economy.1
To make our analysis, we use the model developed by Jones (2002). There are two main reasons for
this choice. First, this framework is a very good illustration since it is complete both on a theoretical
and on an empirical point of view. The author performs an interesting study on the source of the
economic growth in United-States (US). He uses a model incorporating a R&D activity, physical capital
accumulation, education of individuals and population growth. He finds that resources allocated to
research have increased because in addition to population growth both the level of education and
the share of labor allocated to research have grown; he explains that 80 percent of US economic
growth is due to increases in human capital investment rates and research intensity while population
growth accounts only for 20 percent. Second, we give an answer to a question asked by the author
himself in his paper. He writes about his framework: “This can be viewed as a precursor to the richer
analysis that comes from adding markets to the model and analyzing equilibrium conditions as well
as technologies” (p. 223). Then, the author suggests to characterize an equilibrium since he has just
1An other drawback is that the shares of labor allocated to the different sectors of the economy are exogenously given.
In contrast, in the present analysis, they are endogenous. We compute their exact values as a functions of the parameters
of the model.
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performed an empirical analysis of his model without accounting for goods’ markets. In that sense,
our analysis completes Jones’ (2002) one by adding markets and by computing the relevant prices of
goods produced in the economy.
The research activity cannot be funded like in the standard R&D-based literature. Then, we try
to formalize ideas expressed by economists like Arrow (1962), Dasgupta et-al (1996), Scotchmer (1991,
1999), Lerner and Tirole (2002). Because of the public good nature of innovations, several problems
arise. The first ones are standard in economics literature. First, they are relative to the possibility
to verify which agent uses a discovery. Second they are linked to the possibility to exclude any agent
that does not pay to access to an innovation. Third, they concern the problems of informations about
the willingness to pay of agents.
The second types of problem are due to the non convexity of technologies using ideas as productive
factors. Indeed, most of economists agree with the replication argument. According to Feehan (1989),
Manning et-al (1985), Sandmo (1972), Kaizuka (1965), and more recently according to Romer (1990),
and Jones (2003) among others, technologies display constant returns to scale with respect to private
inputs and increasing returns with respect to both private and public inputs. As in a competitive
market the payment of private factors fully exhausts revenue, firms are unable to pay for the public
good they use. As pointed out by Jones (2003), this fundamental property leads to several problems, in
particular on the type of equilibrium considered to fund research. For instance, a perfectly competitive
equilibrium does not exist, except if research is publicly funded. Thus, imperfect competition appears
as a necessary condition to give private incentives to invest in research.
In the present framework, we construct two possible equilibria. Following Arrow (1962) who
points out that “the property rights may be in the information itself, through patents and similar
legal devices” (p. 149), we assume that ideas are protected by property rights. Like Lerner and Tirole
(2002), we define a specific market and a price for the ideas produced by the scientists. Then, we
assume that scientist keep the property rights and license their ideas to any user of discoveries. That
is, any agent using innovations must directly reward researchers who have produced them. In that
way, we are consistent with Scotchmer (1991) who writes: “A system of property rights that might
seem natural would be to protect the first innovator so broadly that licensing is required from all
second generations innovators who use the initial technology, whether in research or in production”
(p. 32).
In the first equilibrium considered, there is perfect competition on all private goods markets. To
implement the first best optimum, we assume that each agent using a discovery pays its maximum
willingness to pay. As mentioned above, this practice requires the possibility to verify, which agent
uses an innovation and when the discovery is used. It is necessary to be able to exclude any agent
that does not pay to access to a discovery. Moreover, it requires a complete information about the
willingness to pay of each agent. To avoid potential negative profits due to increasing returns to scale,
we assume that firms using knowledge as a productive factor are subsidized by the government. In that
case, research is publicly funded which may, perhaps, appear unrealistic. However, this equilibrium
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must be seen as a benchmark. In the second equilibrium considered, research is privately funded. To
deal with the non-convexity of production processes, we assume that there is imperfect competition
on the markets whose technologies use knowledge as a productive factor. Therefore, we are consistent
with Jones (2003) who argues that the non-rival property of ideas prevents the perfect competition to
prevail (see p. 2).
One must note that the equilibria described in our paper and, as said above, suggested for instance
by Arrow (1962), Dasgupta et-al (1996), Scotchmer (1991, 1999), Lerner and Tirole (2002), diverge
greatly from the ones studied in the standard R&D-based literature. Indeed, in addition to the fact
that we do not specify any intermediate goods production sector, the equilibria we characterize display
complete markets. A strange aspect of the standard R&D-based models comes from the fact that the
discoveries produced by scientists and which are public, indivisible and infinitely durable goods, have
not any specific price. In these models, the goods sold are the private intermediate goods embodying
ideas, but the ideas themselves are not. In our knowledge, neither in the literature on endogenous
growth nor in the well-known books of Grossman and Helpman (1991b) Barro and Sala-I-Martin
(1995), Aghion and Howitt (1998), any author defines a market and a price for discoveries. Thus,
these models induce equilibria with incomplete markets. Note that this property allows to keep the
perfectly competitive assumption in all markets (except the one of intermediate goods). However,
the non-convexity problem raised by the non-rival property of ideas is not solved by the existence
of imperfect competition. It is solved by the incompleteness of markets. In these models, imperfect
competition on the market of intermediate goods is just a mean to fund indirectly research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in Section 2. We
characterize the perfectly competitive equilibrium of the model in Section 3. We construct an imperfect
competition equilibrium in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5. The Appendix is provided in Section
6.
2 The model
We consider the same model than Jones (2002) with identical notations. Nevertheless, in contrast with
the author who takes the rate of savings as exogenously given, here we assume that it is endogenous.
We show how to compute equilibria with an exogenous rate of savings in Appendix 6.4.
Time is continuous and three kinds of goods are produced in the economy: a consumption-capital
good (“output”), ideas and human capital. Total output Yt produced at time t is given by,
Yt = (At)
σ (Kt)
α (HY t)
1−α (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) , σ > 0, Kt is physical capital, HY t is the total quantity of human capital employed
to produce output and At is the total stock of ideas available in the economy. Physical capital is
accumulated through the process,
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•
Kt = Yt −Ct − dKt (2)
where d > 0 is the exogenous constant rate of depreciation and Ct is aggregate consumption.
Ideas are produced by researchers through the technology,
•
At = δ (HAt)
λ (At)
φ (3)
where δ > 0 is a constant productivity parameter,
•
At is the total number of ideas produced per
unit of time and HAt is the total quantity of human capital devoted to research. The possibility
of duplication effect or redundancy in research is captured by λ ∈ (0, 1] , and φ < 1 allows past
discoveries to either increase (φ > 0) or decrease (φ < 0) current research productivity. To highlight
the duplication effect in research, we assume that innovations are produced by a large number S
(s = 1, ..., S) of firms whose technologies are identical and given by
•
Ast = ζtH
s
At (At)
φ , where
•
Ast is
the number of innovations produced by a typical firm s, HsAt represents the amount of human capital
employed in this firm, and ζt is a productivity factor in research which is external to each firm and
which verifies ζt = (HAt)
λ−1.2 The stock of knowledge, At, is formed by ideas or innovations, i, which
take for example the form of scientific reports. Formally, each innovation is a particular point of the
set [0, At] which expands over-time. In the two equilibria we construct, innovations are patented and
priced goods.
The quantities of human capital employed producing output and ideas are respectively given by,
HY t = htLY t (4)
and
HAt = (ht)
θ LAt (5)
where LY t is the total amount of raw labor employed producing output, LAt represents the number
of scientists in the economy, ht is human capital per person and θ ≥ 0 is a constant parameter. The
individual’s human capital is produced forgoing labor in the labor force through the process
ht = eψLHt/Nt (6)
where ψ > 0 is a constant parameter, LHt is the quantity of labor devoted to education and Nt is the
total number of individuals in the economy at date t.
Finally, the economy is composed of an infinitely lived representative household whose members are
identical and grow over-time at the exogenous rate, n > 0. At each time, their number is Nt = N0ent
where N0 > 0 is the initial number of members of the household at time 0. The preferences of the
2Jones (2002) does not disaggregate the research sector. However, our specification is still compatible with the motion
of ideas of his model given in the present note by equation (3).
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household are represented by the discounted utility function
U =
∞Z
0
(ct)
1−ε − 1
1− ε Nte
−ρtdt (7)
where ct ≡ Ct/Nt is per-capita consumption at time t, ε > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of
substitution and ρ > 0 is the rate of time preferences. Each individual is endowed with one unit of
labor and divides this unit among producing goods, producing ideas, and producing human capital.
Thus, the aggregate resource constraint is given by,
Nt = LY t + LAt + LHt (8)
3 Perfectly competitive equilibrium
Our objective is to compute an equilibrium with complete and perfectly competitive markets. Con-
cerning the financing of innovations, we make two assumptions. Firstly, R&D firms protect their
innovations by an infinitely-lived patent giving them the possibility to exclude any agent that does
not pay ideas they produce. Secondly, they are able to practice a first degree price discrimination
among agents: any firm using knowledge as a productive factor pays the maximum price it is willing
to pay to access to scientific reports. In that way, we follow Dasgupta et-al (1996) who write: “A
possible scheme is for society to grant intellectual property rights to private producers for their dis-
coveries, and permit them to charge (possibly differential) fees for their use by others. This creates
private markets for knowledge. Patent and copyright protections are means of enforcing intellectual
property rights. It is as well to note here that, in this scheme the producer (or owner) of a piece of
information should ideally set different prices for different buyers, because different buyers typically
value the information differently. In economics, these variegated prices are called Lindahl prices, in
honor of the person who provided the first articulation of this scheme” (p. 10). Since technolo-
gies using knowledge display constant returns to scale with respect to private factors inducing that
their payment completely exhaust firms’ revenue, we assume that the willingness to pay of firms are
subsidized by the government.
To justify this approach, we assume that the R&D sector keeps its infinitely-lived patents and
licenses them to potential users. In that way, any agent using a patented innovation rewards directly
the researcher or the scientist who has produced it. Then, the price of an idea is defined by the value
of the license. Note that we are consistent with Arrow (1962) who explains: “Suppose, as the result of
elaborate tests, some metal is discovered to have a desirable property, say resistance to high heat. Then
of course every use of the metal for which this property is relevant would also use this information,
and the user would be made to pay for it. But, even more, if another inventor is stimulated to examine
chemically related metals for heat resistance, he is using the information already discovered and should
pay for it in some measure; and any beneficiary of his discoveries should also pay” (p. 150). Formally,
6
in our economy, two types of agents will pay (or buy a license) to use innovations: first, the R&D
sector (see equation (3)); second, the final sector (see equation (1)).
In this context, the duplication effect in research remains the only external effect. Thus, in order
to implement an optimal balanced growth path, we assume that the government intervenes by the
mean of a tax rate τ t charged on R&D firms. The two economic policies of the government (subsidies
for the use of discoveries and the tax charged on R&D firms) are financed through a lump-sum tax ,
Tt, charged on the representative household.
First, we characterize the behavior of the agents. Second, we derive the solution of the decentralized
equilibrium and we show how the government may implement the optimal balanced growth path. We
assume that the representative household buys physical capital and patents from the R&D sector and
rents them to firms. The price of the final homogenous good is normalized to one. The unit price of
human capital employed in the final sector, the one of human capital employed in research, the rental
price of capital and the rate of return on R&D investment are respectively noted qY t, qAt, rKt and rAt.
We denote by vY t and vsAt the prices paid by the final sector’s firm and any R&D firm s to use an
innovation. Finally, the growth rate of any variable x is noted gx.
3.1 Behavior of agents
a) The final sector’s firm maximizes its profit given by ΠY t = (At)σ (Kt)α (HY t)1−α−rKtKt−qY tHY t,
which gives,
rKt = α
Yt
Kt
(9)
qY t = (1− α)
Yt
HY t
(10)
Moreover, the willingness to pay, vY t, of the representative firm to use an innovation is given by,
vY t = ∂ΠY t/∂At = σYt/At.
b) In the R&D sector the profit of a firm s is ΠsAt = VtζtHsAt (At)
φ − qAt (1 + τ t)HsAt, where Vt is
the value of an innovation (see below). The free-entry condition is,
Vtζt (At)
φ = (1 + τ t) qAt (11)
In addition, the willingness to pay of a research firm s to have access to the stock of knowledge is
given by, vsAt = ∂ΠsAt/∂At = φVtζtHsAt (At)
φ−1 . The value of an innovation is measured by the flow
of gains earned from the date at which the researcher has discovered a new idea and has patented it,
until the infinity. Thus, we can write Vt =
∞R
t
vue
−
uR
t
rA(s)ds
du, where vu is the instantaneous gain from
the sale of an innovation. It is equal to the sum of the willingnesses to pay of the final sector’s firm
and of the research firms: it verifies vt = vY t + vAt where vAt =
SP
s=1
vsAt. Note that differentiating the
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expression of Vt with respect to time yields,
rAt =
vt
Vt
+
•
Vt
Vt
(12)
c) Concerning the government, we assume that his budget constraint is balanced at each time.
It is given by Tt = vY t +
SP
s=1
vsAt − τ tqAtHAt, where τ tqAtHAt represents the tax on human capital
charged on research firms. To implement an optimal equilibrium path, at each time he chooses τ t that
maximizes the total welfare.
d) Finally, the representative household chooses the per-capita consumption path and the quantities
of labor allocated to the production of output, of ideas and of his level of skill.3 Solving his problem
(whose proof is provided in the Appendix 6.1) one can find the usual Keynes-Ramsey rule,
εgc + ρ = rAt = rKt − d (13)
and
LY t
Nt
=
1
ψ
− θLAt
Nt
. (14)
3.2 Characterization of the perfectly competitive equilibrium
In this section we focus on the balanced growth path. The time subscript is skipped from the policy
tool, τ, which must be constant in that case. Given the agents’ behavior, we can determine the growth
rates of the variables in the economy and we can compute the shares of labor allocated to the different
sectors as a function of the tax, τ , charged on R&D firms. Proposition 1 summarizes the results
obtained in this economy. Equilibrium values are denoted with a subscript ”∗”. The proof of the
proposition is gathered in Appendix 6.1.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium balanced growth path with perfect competition on private goods markets
and research funded at Lindahl prices levels is characterized by constant growth rates,
g∗HY = g
∗
HA = n,
g∗A =
λn
(1− φ) ,
g∗c = g
∗
Y − n =
σ
(1− α)g
∗
A,
3 It is possible to decentralize the human capital production process. In that case, we can compute additional prices
corresponding to the individual’s level of human capital and to the level of wage of raw labor. The way to decentralize
the educational process is gathered in Appendix 6.4.
8
